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EXECUTIVE POWER, NATIONAL SECURITY &
FEDERAL EMPLOYEE COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING RIGHTS: THE NEW DEPARTMENT
OF HOMELAND SECURITY
I. INTRODUCTION

It is the responsibility of the United States Federal Government to
protect the welfare of its citizens.' The challenges that the federal government faces in fighting the war against terrorism are daunting. The
September 1 1 th terrorist attacks on our nation demonstrated the new
threats to our national security and the critical need for a flexible government to defend against them. As a result of the terrorist attacks, the
federal government has been forced to reevaluate how it operates to ensure that it will be able to preserve the security of America and protect
its citizens in the future. Much of the debate has focused on the structure
of the government agencies that are responsible for homeland security.2
Specifically, it addressed the flexibility granted to the President and, derivatively, to executive branch officials, which enables them to effectively direct the federal workforce tasked with the mission of protecting
the homeland.
Unlike private sector employees, whose rights and obligations regarding the authority to collectively bargain and organize, are set out in
the National Labor Relations Act, 4 federal employees are covered and
governed by the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute
("FSLMRS").5 In fact, the rights of federal employees are more narrow

1. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
2. See Press Statement, Senator Joseph Lieberman, Chairman, United States Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Lieberman Calls for Homeland Security Vote Warns Against GOP
Pork, Special Interest Projects, (Nov. 13, 2002) [hereinafter Lieberman Calls for Homeland Security
Vote] (on file with authors).
3.

See id.

4. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2000).
5. Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7135 (2000).
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in scope than that of their private sector counterparts.6 This note focuses
on Chapter 71 of the Civil Service Reform Act, which is the FSLMRS.
As of 2002, of the 1.7 million federal executive branch employees,
more than one million were represented by unions. 7 Of the federal employees that have collective bargaining rights, a significant number of
them are involved in domestic security.8 Recently, as a result of the September 11 h terrorist attacks, policymakers have raised questions as to
whether our domestic defenses are hampered due to these collective bargaining rights. In particular, issues have been raised as to whether the
collective bargaining rights of federal employees inhibit the operational
9
flexibility of agencies involved in national security.
These concerns have surfaced because the threats to our national
security have been redefined in the post-September 11 th environment.
The threats to our national security are no longer limited to nation-states
that use conventional weapons to achieve their objectives. Rather, the
threats in today's environment are dispersed, not easily identifiable nor
detectable.
In section 7103(b) of the FSLMRS, the President is granted the authority, for national security reasons, to exempt parts of agencies and
even entire agencies within the federal government from collective bargaining.10 This provision of the FSLMRS was closely scrutinized when
both Congress and the administration developed a Department of Homeland Security in the federal government. The Department took twentytwo separate federal agencies that were in existence, which employed
over 170,000 federal employees, and combined them into one department based on their common mission characteristics." The administration's restructuring effort was designed to combine the disparate subdivisions of agencies within the federal government involved in domestic
security in order to promote efficiency and communication, and most
importantly, improve overall effectiveness. Of those federal employees
that were transferred into the new department, over 43,000 are repre2
sented by unions.1

6.
7.
8.

See RICHARD C. KEARNEY, LABOR RELATIONS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 60 (2d ed. 1992).
OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT., UNION RECOGNITION IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (2002).
Id.

9.

See Lieberman Calls for Homeland Security Vote, supra note 2.

10. 5 U.S.C. § 7103(b)(1)(A)-(B) (2000).
11. Snags on the HomelandFront, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2002, at AI6.
12. Letter from Joseph Lieberman, Chairman of United States Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, to all members of the U.S. Senate (Aug. 29, 2002) (on file with authors).
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The manner in which the national security exemption would be applied to the Department of Homeland Security resulted in an impasse in
the passage of the legislation that lasted for several months. 13 The impasse was finally resolved when the Democrats lost majority control of
the Senate in the 2002 elections.' 4 Essentially, the Democrats in the Senate wanted to restrict the broad language of the national security exemption that granted the President with the authority to remove certain
groups of federal employees from the FSLMRS.15 Opponents were concerned that President Bush wanted to use both the Homeland Defense
Bill and the issue of national security as a vehicle to diminish the collective bargaining rights of federal employees.' 6 This note will argue that
this impasse was a struggle based on politics and not on whether the collective bargaining rights of federal employees inhibit the flexibility and
efficiency of the federal workforce in addressing threats to our national
security.
First, this note will provide a historical background on the evolution
of federal employees' organizational and collective bargaining rights.
Second, it will present a comparison of federal employee rights with
those of private sector employees and give a brief explanation for the
differences. Third, the note will address the application of the national
security exemption from its origin up until today. Fourth, it will discuss
the legislative history of the Department of Homeland Security Act and
the impact it will have on federal employee collective bargaining rights
in the future. For example, this note will briefly discuss the first battle in
preserving federal employee collective bargaining rights in the postSeptember 11 th environment, which involves the Transportation Security
Administration ("TSA"). In this battle, the airport screeners of the TSA
were the first employees of the Department of Homeland Security to be
excluded from collective bargaining because of national security reasons. Finally, there will be a discussion on the statutory interpretation of
federal employee collective bargaining rights under the FSLMRS to determine and distinguish between those bargaining items that are permissive from those that are compulsory to the parties. This analysis will
demonstrate the limited scope of the issues that federal employees can
actually collectively bargain over with their employer. Moreover, this
13. See Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Senate Votes for Homeland Security Department, BALT. SUN,
Nov. 20, 2002, at IA.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. AM. FED'N OF Gov'T EMPLOYEES ("AFGE"), You ALREADY HAVE THE FLEXIBILITY
YOU SEEK 3 (2002).
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limitation establishes that compulsory collective bargaining rights do not
inhibit the efficiency and effectiveness of the federal workforce in addressing national security threats.
This statutory analysis will demonstrate that the protections afforded to federal employees do not affect the flexibility and capability of
these agencies to effectively respond to national security threats. Moreover, the note will show that the President, even without the national security exemption authority, has the power to address these threats. This
will be proven by discussing the limited scope of collective bargaining
rights and the broad rights granted to management in the FSLMRS. It
will be demonstrated that the debate was based more on political rhetoric
than on the fact that the current system of unionized federal employees
impedes the federal government's ability to protect the nation. Therefore, federal employees that are part of the new Department of Homeland Security should retain their right to collectively bargain.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF FEDERAL LABOR ORGANIZATIONS AND FEDERAL
EMPLOYEE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING RIGHTS

A. The Origin of FederalLabor Organizations
To understand the policy and politics surrounding the current debate regarding federal employee collective bargaining rights, it is important to know the history behind their development. The origin of labor
organizations in the federal sector can be traced back to the early 1800s,
where their first significant impact was felt in federal shipyards.' 7 During
this period, skilled public employees sought parity with their private sector counterparts who had successfully won the ten-hour workday. 18 In
1836, federal workers achieved equality with their private sector counterparts on this issue when President Andrew Jackson personally granted
federal employees the ten-hour workday.' 9 Ironically, presidential involvement would continue to exist in federal labor relations until the
passage of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 ("CSRA").2 ° Additionally, when labor organizations in both the private and public sector be-

17. KEARNEY, supra note 6, at 10.

18. Id. at 3.
19. Id.
at 10.
20. Id. The FSLMRS is Chapter 71 of the CSRA. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7135 (2000).
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gan to bargain for an eight-hour workday,
it was the federal government
21
that was the first employer to grant it.
The mid-1800s also marked a period during which federal employees began to join labor unions. Postal workers were one of the first significant groups of federal employees to join these unions.22 However,
their efforts to join labor unions were not well received. In 1895, Postmaster General William L. Wilson issued an order that prohibited postal
employees from lobbying the federal government and threatened them
with being fired if they violated the order.2 3
During the same period, Congress passed the Pendleton Act of
1883,24 one of the most significant pieces of federal employee legislation
of its time. This established the federal merit system and gave Congress
the authority to regulate wages, hours and working conditions of federal
employees. 25 Nonetheless, federal employees were not able to collectively bargain regarding these terms and conditions of employment. This
was due to the fact that both Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and William
Howard Taft issued executive orders that prohibited federal employees
from lobbying Congress for improved working conditions or wages.26
However, the postal workers and other federal employees pursued a
campaign against these executive orders, with the assistance of the
American Federation of Labor ("AFL") union. This effort gained the
support of Congress, which passed the Lloyd-LaFollette Act of 1912.27
This act preserved for federal employees their First Amendment right to
organize and petition Congress.28 However, in a compromise made to
ensure passage of the Lloyd-LaFollette Act, federal employees could
only join organizations that did not engage in strikes against the federal
government. 29 As a result of their success with the Lloyd-LaFollette Act,
federal employees began to push for similar rights granted to private
employees.30

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
(1990).

KEARNEY, supra note 6, at 3.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 10-11.
Pendelton Act, 22 Stat. 403 (1883).
CHARLES J. COLEMAN, MANAGING LABOR RELATIONS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 61-62

26.

KEARNEY,

27.
28.
29.
30.

Id.

supra note 6, at 55.

See id.

Id.
Id.
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B. Pre-CivilService Reform Act Executive Orders GoverningFederal
Employee Collective BargainingRights
President Kennedy's Executive Order 10,988 established for federal
31
employees the right to form and join unions and to collectively bargain.
Executive Order 10,988 granted to federal employees some of the rights
granted to private sector employees in the NLRA. 32 It provided for a determination of a bargaining unit and established a set of ground rules to
govern the interactions between unions and management.3 3 The Order
encompassed almost all federal employees with the exception of those
involved in national security. 34 Specifically, section 16 of Executive Order 10,988 excluded the Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA") and Federal Bureau of Investigations ("FBI"), since their primary mission was
"performing intelligence, investigative, or security functions. 35 In addition to these two agencies, the Executive Order left open the possibility
that, in the future, other agencies or subdivisions with similar mission
responsibilities could be excluded.36 For other agencies to be excluded,
this Order required that the head of an agency determine that the "provisions of the order could not be applied in a manner consistent with national security requirements and considerations." 37 These were the
grounds for the exclusion of the CIA and FBI.38
The rights granted to federal agency management officials by the
Executive Order received much criticism from unions. 39 Labor organizations believed that the rights provided employers with too much authority and undermined the ability of federal employees to effectively bargain.40 One of the main criticisms leveled against the Executive Order
was that the rights granted to management severely restricted what fed-

31.

Exec. Order No. 10,988, 27 Fed. Reg. 551 (Jan. 19, 1962).

32.

Id.

33. Id.
34. Id. See also 5 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(3)(A)-(H). In 1978, through the Federal Service LaborManagement Relations Statute many parts of Executive Order 10,988 were codified. In fact, the
statute excluded from the definition of "employee organization" both the Central Intelligence
Agency and Federal Bureau of Investigations and in addition, added the General Accounting Office,
National Security Agency, Tennessee Valley Authority, Federal Labor Relations Authority, Federal
Service Impasses Panel and the United States Secret Service. Id.
35. Exec. Order No. 10,988, 27 Fed. Reg. 551 (Jan. 19, 1962).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See KEARNEY, supranote 6, at 57.
40. Id.
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eral employees could actually bargain over.4 1 In particular, unions complained about the severe restrictions created by the management rights
provision in that it prohibited bargaining over wages, benefits and union
security provisions.42 For example, some of the management rights established by Executive Order 10,988 included: (1) to direct employees of
the agency; (2) to hire, promote, transfer, assign and retain employees in
positions within the agency, and to suspend, demote, discharge or take
disciplinary action; (3) to relieve employees from duties because of lack
of work or for other legitimate reasons; (4) to maintain the efficiency of
government operations entrusted to them; (5) to determine the methods,
means and personnel by which such operations are to be conducted; and
(6) to take whatever actions may be necessary to carry out the mission of
the agency in situations of emergency. 43 By explicitly defining these
management rights, federal employees were effectively excluded from
collectively bargaining over these areas of employment. Of note, many,
if not all, of these areas are open to negotiation in the private sector.
Executive Order 10,988 provided the legal framework that governed labor-management relations in the federal government until the
late 1970s, when it came under attack.44 As noted, unions complained
that the scope of the bargaining rights granted to federal employees in
the Executive Order was too narrow. In addition, labor organizations
complained that federal employees were prohibited from striking and
that they were left with no other bargaining leverage alternative. 45 Furthermore, the ultimate resolution of any employee grievance remained
with the head of the department in which it originated.46 Unions argued
that the balance of power weighed too heavily in favor of the federal
government agencies. President Nixon attempted to address these criticisms through Executive Order 11,49147 of October 1969. In particular,
two presidential committees studied and identified the deficiencies of
Executive Order 10,988, one appointed by President Johnson and the
other by President Nixon.4 8 Executive Order 11,491 changed the manner
in which bargaining impasses and grievance disputes were addressed.49
Moreover, the Order authorized binding arbitration and established the
41.

Id.

42.

Id.

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Exec. Order No. 10,988, 27 Fed. Reg. 551 (Jan. 19, 1962).
See KEARNEY, supra note 6, at 57.
See id.

48.

KEARNEY, supra note 6, at 57.

Id.
Exec. Order No. 11,491, 34 Fed. Reg. 17,605 (Oct. 31, 1969).

49. Exec. Order No. 11,491, 34 Fed. Reg. 17,605 (Oct. 31, 1969).
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right of a third party to overrule agency heads and resolve impasses over
contract negotiations.5 °
Two executive orders that strengthened federal employee collective
bargaining rights are Executive Order 11,616 and Executive Order
11,838. In August 1971, President Nixon issued Executive Order
11,616, 5 which amended Executive Order 11,491. For the purposes of
this note, this executive order resulted in one notable change. Specifically, it made negotiated grievance procedures for resolving contract
disputes mandatory for labor organizations and federal employees. 52 In
February 1974, President Ford issued Executive Order 11,838, 53 the last
in a series of executive orders that had governed labor-management relations in the federal sector for nearly a quarter of a century. 54 Noteworthy
impacts of this executive order are that it slightly broadened the scope of
collective bargaining and implemented procedural changes involving
contract negotiations. 55 Collective bargaining rights are not only essential to federal employees, but they are also essential to the efficiency of
the government. These collective bargaining rights give federal employees a voice that allows them to improve working conditions and assist
management in promoting a more efficient and effective working environment.
Thus, unlike the private sector that had been governed by statute,
the early basis of federal employee labor-management relations was
governed by executive orders. This government policy had the advantage
of being flexible, since changes could be more easily made through a
presidential order modifying federal labor-management policy, rather
than a statute that required the consensus of Congress.56 However, after
years of union pressure, Congress codified federal employee rights by
passing the CSRA.
C. Civil Service Reform Act of 1978
The CSRA is regarded as one of the most important pieces of legislation regarding federal employment since the Pendleton Act. 57 It codi-

50. Id.
51.

Exec. Order No. 11,616, 36 Fed. Reg. 17,319 (Aug. 28, 1971).

52. Id.
53.
54.
55.
56.

See Exec. Order No. 11,838, 40 Fed. Reg. 5,743,7391 (Feb. 7, 1974).
See KEARNEY, supra note 6, at 58.
Exec. Order No. 11,838,40 Fed. Reg. 5,743,7391 (Feb. 7, 1974).
KEARNEY, supra note 6, at 58.

57. Id. at 59.
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fled many of the federal employee labor rights that were established by
Executive Order 10,988 and subsequent executive orders. One of the areas of the CSRA that this note will focus on is the FSLMRS, which includes provisions governing labor-management relations. In particular,
this note focuses on the President's power to remove federal employees
from collective bargaining.5 8 In addition, it will also examine the interaction between management rights and employee rights, and its impact on
the operation of government.
III. A COMPARISON OF FEDERAL AND PRIVATE SECTOR EMPLOYEE
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING RIGHTS

The National Labor Relations Act of 1935 ("Wagner Act"), which
was subsequently amended by both the Labor Management Relations
Act of 1947 ("Taft-Hartley Act") and the Labor Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act of 1959 ("Landrum-Griffin Act"), governs private
sector collective bargaining and labor organizations. 59 The National Labor Relations Board is responsible for administering labor policy in the
private sector. 6 0 It is also responsible for investigating and adjudicating
claims of unfair labor practices. 6' It provides guidelines for the make-up
of an employee bargaining unit and the selection of a union as the representative for the bargaining unit.6 ' The purpose of these legislative acts
was to encourage workers to form and join unions and collectively bargain with their employers. 63 The Taft-Hartley Act balanced the power
granted to unions through the Wagner Act by putting restrictions on union conduct and procedures. 64 The Landrum-Griffin Act, on the other
hand, rooted out corruption in unions and protected union members by
regulating internal affairs for unions and requiring an accounting for expenditures and financial records.65
While private sector employees were granted statutory labor rights
in both the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts, federal employees received
little mention. In fact, the only mention was in the Taft-Hartley Act section 305, which prohibited federal employees from striking.66 Federal
58.

5 U.S.C. § 7103(b) (2000).

59. KEARNEY, supranote 6, at 54-55.
60. 29 U.S.C. § 151(3) (2000).
61. Id.
62.

§ 151(1).

63. Id.
64. KEARNEY, supra note 6, at 55.
65. Id.
66.

Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120 § 305, 29 U.S.C. § 188 (1952)
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employees attempted to achieve parity or at least recognition for their
organizations through the Rhodes-Johnson Bill, which repeatedly failed
in Congress.6 7 It was not until the 1960s, when President Kennedy, who
received strong support from labor organizations, created a presidential
task force to recommend a labor-management relations program for the
federal government. 68 The task force's recommendations were incorporated into Executive Order 10,988,69 which formed the foundation for

our current day labor policy regarding federal employees.
The advancement of federal employee rights and labor organizations did not proceed at the same pace as those of the private sector. In
fact, federal employees have not achieved parity with their private sector
counterparts. As noted, private sector employees received statutory recognition of their rights in the 1930s, and it was not until the 1960s that
federal employees would begin to make similar progress. In particular,
the 1960s marked a significant advancement and growth in public sector
employee rights. There are three main reasons for this: (1) the growth of
the government; (2) the private sector experience; and (3) changes in the
public sector legal environment. 70 First, from 1960 to 1970 the number
of government jobs nearly doubled. 71 Although most of the growth was
in the state and local governments, the increase in the number of government employees provided an opportunity for union organizers to recruit new members, and they capitalized upon it. 72 This growth ultimately resulted in an increase in the strength of unions in the public
sector. 73 Moreover, the growth of government led to the bureaucratization of government service. 74 Government employees, due to the complex organizational structure and lack of communication, felt the need
for unions to act as their voice for their interests in negotiations with
management. 75 Having a voice in the organization they work for was and
continues to be viewed as a victory for government employees.
Second, federal employees noticed the success -that unions had in
improving wages, work conditions and benefits for private employees

(repealed 1955).

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

KEARNEY, supranote 6, at 55.
Id.
Exec. Order No. 10,988, 27 Fed. Reg. 551 (Jan. 19, 1962).
KEARNEY, supra note 6, at 15.
Id.
Id. at 15-16.
Id.
Id. at 16.

75.

Id.
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and sought their assistance.7 6 Federal employees were frustrated with the
complex and burdensome process that addressed their demands, and believed that labor organizations would be a more effective means to represent their interests, as they had proven to be successful in the private
sector. 77
Third, changes in the legal environment helped to foster the advancement of public sector labor laws. As noted, one of the most significant events that provided the foundation for future public sector labor
laws was President Kennedy's Executive Order 10,988 of 1962. Even
though the Order restricted the scope of collective bargaining for federal
employees relative to their private sector counterparts, this was a major
step in federal employee rights. This Executive Order finally marked
government recognition of federal employee collective bargaining rights.
Although federal employees did not receive parity with their private
sector counterparts, the rights they were granted are substantial and concrete. This recognition not only required federal employers to recognize
federal employee collective bargaining units, but it also provided for a
formal collective bargaining procedure.
IV. PRESIDENTIAL USE OF THE NATIONAL
SECURITY EXEMPTION

Section 7103(b)(1) of the FSLMRS provides the President with the
authority to exclude federal employees from collective bargaining when
their jobs involve issues of national security.78 Specifically, the President
can exclude an agency or a subdivision of an agency from coverage under the FSLMRS if the President determines that:
(1) the agency or subdivision has as a primary function intelligence,
counterintelligence, investigative, or national security work, and
(2) the provisions of the Federal Labor Management Relations Program cannot be applied to that agency or subdivision in a manner79consistent with the national security requirements and considerations.
President Kennedy established this national security exemption in
1962 with Executive Order 10,988.80 This exemption was codified in the

76. Id. at 17.
77. Id.
78. 5 U.S.C. § 7103(b)(1) (2000).
79. Id.
80. Exec. Order No. 10,988, 27 Fed. Reg. 551 (Jan. 19, 1962).
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CSRA of 1978.81 Historically, in order to exempt an agency or a subdivision of an agency for national security reasons, a President had to issue
an executive order, citing to section 7103(b)(1) as authority. These executive orders have not included an extensive explanation or justification
to exclude an agency. Past executive orders to exclude an agency have
only provided as justification the language set forth in section
7103(b)(1). 82 Since passage of the CSRA, five different Presidents have
issued a total of eleven executive orders excluding agencies or subdivisions from coverage under the FSLMRS due to national security reasons. 8 3 There has only been one occasion where the President's authority
84
under this section has been challenged. In AFGE, AFL-CIO v. Reagan,
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the national
security section "does not expressly call upon the President to insert
written findings into an exempting order, or indeed to utilize any particular format for such an order., 85 The court further held that when the
President exercises any authority that is delegated to him, he is presumed86
to have properly exercised his authority in accordance with the law.
Based on this holding, the President need not provide any further justification other than claiming national security as the basis for this exemption.
Even without the authority granted to the President in the national
security exemption set forth in section 7103(b), Congress has provided
other numerous safeguards to ensure that federal employee protections

81. § 7103(b).
82. Exec. Order No. 12,171, 44 Fed. Reg. 66565 (Nov. 19, 1979); Exec. Order No. 12,338, 47
Fed. Reg. 1,369 (Jan. 11, 1982); Exec. Order No. 12,410, 48 Fed. Reg. 13,143 (Mar. 28, 1983);
Exec. Order No. 12,559, 51 Fed. Reg. 18,761 (May 20, 1986); Exec. Order No. 12,632, 53 Fed.
Reg. 9,852 (Mar. 23, 1988); Exec. Order No. 12,666, 54 Fed. Reg. 1,921 (Jan. 12, 1989); Exec. Order No. 12,671, 54 Fed. Reg. 11,157 (Mar. 14, 1989); Exec. Order No. 12,681, 54 Fed. Reg. 28,997
(July 6, 1989); Exec. Order No. 12,693, 54 Fed. Reg. 40,629 (Sept. 29, 1989); Exec. Order No.
13,039, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,529 (Mar. 11,1997); Exec. Order No. 13,252, 67 Fed. Reg. 1,601 (Jan. 7,
2002).
83. See Exec. Order No. 12,171, 44 Fed. Reg. 66565 (Nov. 19, 1979); Exec. Order No.
12,338,47 Fed. Reg. 1,369 (Jan. 11, 1982); Exec. Order No. 12,410, 48 Fed. Reg. 13,143 (Mar. 28,
1983); Exec. Order No. 12,559, 51 Fed. Reg. 18,761 (May 20, 1986); Exec. Order No. 12,632, 53
Fed. Reg. 9,852 (Mar. 23, 1988); Exec. Order No. 12,666, 54 Fed. Reg. 1,921 (Jan. 12, 1989); Exec.
Order No. 12,671, 54 Fed. Reg. 11,157 (Mar. 14, 1989); Exec. Order No. 12,681, 54 Fed. Reg.
28,997 (July 6, 1989); Exec. Order No. 12,693, 54 Fed. Reg. 40,629 (Sept. 29, 1989); Exec. Order
No. 13,039, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,529 (Mar. 11, 1997); Exec. Order No. 13,252, 67 Fed. Reg. 1,601 (Jan.
7, 2002). See infra Appendix A for a list of all agencies and subdivisions that have been excluded
from coverage under the FSLMRS.
84. 870 F.2d 723 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
85. Id. at 727.
86. Id.
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do not inhibit the federal government's ability to protect our nation's security. A statutory analysis of the FSLMRS will demonstrate that even
without the national security exemption, the President has the necessary
power to ensure an effective and flexible government that is capable of
responding to threats to our national security. Arguably, section 7103(b)
is unnecessary when the FSLMRS is analyzed as a whole.
V. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF HOMELAND SECURITY

As noted earlier, the impetus that led to the creation of a Department of Homeland Security was the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks
on the United States. However, initially, President Bush and his administration did not push, nor outwardly support, the creation of a Department of Homeland Security . Rather, Senate Democrats, led by Senator
Joseph Lieberman (D-Conn.) started the legislative process that would88
eventually lead to the creation of a Department of Homeland Security.
As a result of this process, a national debate and a fierce political battle
began, especially since the 2002 Congressional elections were on the horizon and both parties wanted to present an image as being the political
party protecting America's security. 89 One of the issues that arose out of
the political debate about whether a new government department should
be created was the issue of federal employee collective bargaining
rights. 90
The Senate Democrats brought the collective bargaining issue to the
forefront on May 2, 2002, when Senator Lieberman, as Chairman of the
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, introduced S. 2452, 9' a bill
in the Senate proposing the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security and the National Office for Combating Terrorism. 92 The
section of S. 2452 that created the issue for this note was section 108.
87. Lieberman Calls for Homeland Security Vote, supra note 2.
88. Id. See also S. 1534, 107th Cong. (2001).
89. Lieberman Calls for Homeland Security Vote, supra note 2, at 2-3.
90. Id. at 6.
91. S. 2452, 107th Cong. (2002).
92. Lieberman Calls for Homeland Security Vote, supra note 2 at 2.
93. S. 2452 § 108(f)(2). This section provides:
(2) EMPLOYEE RIGHTS. (A) IN GENERAL. - The Department or the subdivision within the Department shall
not be excluded under section 7103(b)(1) of title 5, United States Code, from coverage
under chapter 71 of that title unless the President determines that a majority of employees within the Department or applicable subdivision have, as their primary job duty, intelligence, counterintelligence, or investigative work directly related to terrorism investi-
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Democrats drafted this section to ensure that federal employees
who would be transferred to the Department of Homeland Security
would retain their collective bargaining rights unless their job changed
and there was an actual national security basis for taking their rights
away. However, the proposed legislation did provide that collective bargaining rights could be withdrawn from employees at the Department if
their primary duties consisted of intelligence, counterintelligence or investigative duties that were directly related to terrorism investigation,
and if it was demonstrated
that collective bargaining would adversely af94
security.
national
fect
The administration strongly opposed this proposed legislation, arguing that bargaining over certain issues would restrict the President's
authority and the ability of the federal government to defend against
threats to the nation's security. For example, the President argued that
under the FSLMRS, the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS")
would be unable to transfer border patrol agents from one region to another when necessary to protect national security. 95 Thus, if the INS received a report indicating that terrorists were planning on entering the
United States at a given border location, INS officials would be prevented from rapidly shifting border patrol agents to the vulnerable area.
In particular, the administration argued that the provision dealing
with employee rights in section 108 would severely restrict the President's authority under section 7103(b)(1)(A)-(B) of the FSLMRS, authority that was granted to five previous Presidents. As noted, under section 7103, the President has the authority to exempt parts of and even
entire agencies within the federal government from collective bargaining
for national security reasons. However, S. 2452 would have restricted
that authority and placed additional burdens on the President to exempt
agencies and subdivisions of agencies from collective bargaining. Specifically, S. 2452 required the President to demonstrate that the federal

gation.
(B) NATIONAL SECURITY POSITIONS. - Employees transferred under this title
shall not be considered to perform work which directly affects national security within
the meaning of section 7112(b)(6) of title 5, United States Code, unless their primary job
duty involves intelligence, counterintelligence, or investigative duties directly related to
terrorism investigation. All employees transferred under this title who are not in the

counterterrorism positions described in the preceding sentence shall continue to be afforded the full rights and protections under chapter 71 of title 5, United States Code. Id.
94.

Id.

95. Press Release, United States Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Fact v. Fiction:
Setting the Record Straight on "Silly Union Rules" (Oct. 3, 2002) (on file with authors).
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employee's job involved investigative duties directly related to terrorism
investigation.
In June 2002, in response to S. 2452, the President introduced a
proposal to create a Department of Homeland Security. 96 The President's
proposal did not contain a Labor-Management provision.97 By leaving
such a provision out, the administration argued that the President would
retain the authority granted to him under section 7103(b)(1)(A)-(B) in
the FSLMRS.
In support of the President's proposal, Congressman Richard Armey (R-Tex.), Chairman of the Select Committee on Homeland Security
of the House of Representatives, introduced H.R. 5005.98 The purpose of
the bill was to establish a Department of Homeland Security, which was
similar to the President's proposal with some additional improvements.
The section of H.R. 5005 that is the focus of this note is section 762,
which addressed Labor-Management Relations.9 9
Unlike S. 2452, H.R. 5005 included a presidential waiver for homeland security. The purpose of the waiver was to provide the President
with the authority and flexibility needed to address homeland security
issues in the least burdensome manner. However, this waiver required a
written explanation that was not previously required under section
7103(b)(1).°° Although the level of justification required for the written
explanation was not specified, this waiver, if unchallenged, could provide the President with the same flexibility and authority that existed under section 7103(b)(1). Specifically, all that may be necessary is the issuance of a document similar to executive orders issued under section

96. The President's Proposal to Create a Homeland Security Department (proposed June 18,
2002) at http://hsc.house.gov/legislation/proposal.asp (on file with authors).
97. Id.
98. H.R. 5005, 107th Cong. (2002).
99. H.R. 5005. § 762(a). This section provides:
(a) LIMITATION ON EXCLUSIONARY AUTHORITY. (1) IN GENERAL. - No agency or subdivision of an agency which is transferred to the Department pursuant to this Act shall be excluded from the coverage of chapter 71 of title 5, United States
Code, as a result of any order issued under section 7103(b)(1) of such title 5 after June 18, 2002,
unless (A) the mission and responsibilities of the agency (or subdivision) materially change; and
(B) a majority of the employees within such agency (or subdivision) have as their primary duty intelligence, counterintelligence, or investigative work directly related to terrorism investigation. Id.
100. Id. § 762(c). This section provides:
(c) HOMELAND SECURITY. - Subsections (a), (b) and (d) of this section shall not apply in circumstances where the President determines in writing that such application would have a substantial
adverse impact on the Department's ability to protect homeland security. Id.
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7103(b), which includes standard boilerplate language. The House of
Representatives passed H.R. 5005 on July 31, 2002.
However, due to differences that could not be resolved between
H.R. 5005 and S. 2452, a political stalemate occurred. As noted, the issue of federal employee collective bargaining rights, mentioned above,
was one of the major issues that stalled the legislation and became a
critical issue in the 2002 Congressional elections. However, the legislative gridlock was finally broken when Republicans were able to regain
majority control of the Senate and retain control of the House of Representatives when they successfully campaigned on the issue that Democrats were more concerned about union rights than homeland security.' 0'
After the election, the House of Representatives introduced H.R.
57 10,102 nother bill to establish the Department of Homeland Security.
Like H.R. 5005, section 842 of H.R. 5710 addressed the area of labormanagement relations.' 0 3 Specifically, H.R. 5710 section 842 included a
Presidential waiver that provided:
WAIVER - If the President determines that the application of subsections (a), (b), and (d) would have a substantial adverse impact on the
ability of the Department to protect homeland security, the President
may waive the application of such subsections 10 days after the President has submitted to0 4Congress a written explanation of the reasons for
such determination.
The labor-management relations section of H.R. 5710 was identical to
that of H.R. 5005 with one exception. The presidential waiver in H.R.
5710 required that the President wait ten days after submitting the wavier to Congress to exempt federal employees from collective bargaining.
H.R. 5710 was passed by the House of Representatives on November 13,
2002 and forwarded to the Senate. On November 19, 2002, the Senate
passed Senate Amendment 4901, which substituted text essentially the
same as H.R. 5710 in H.R. 5005.05 The House of Representatives
agreed to the Senate amendment on November 22, 2002. This proposed
legislation was submitted to the President and, upon his signature, the

101.
Nov. 21,
102.
103.
104.
105.

See Carl Huse, Its Eyes Fixed on Terrorism, Congress Put Off Many Bills, N.Y. TIMES,
2002, at A34; Lieberman Calls for Homeland Security Vote, supra note 2.
H.R. 5710, 107th Cong. (2002).
H.R.5710§842.
H.R. 5710 § 842 (b)(2)(c).
S. AMEND. 4901, 107thCong. (2002).
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Department of Homeland Security was finally created on November 25,
2002 as Public Law No. 107-296.1°6
The President can easily circumvent the requirements that the mission of an agency within the Department of Homeland Security materially change and that the work of the agency's employees be directly re1 7
lated to combating terrorism through the use of a presidential waiver. 0
Effectively, the presidential waiver allows the President to exclude employees of the Department of Homeland Security from collective bargaining if he believes that their collective bargaining rights will ad08
versely impact the Department's ability to protect the homeland.
However, as argued throughout this note, such a waiver is unnecessary
due to the limited scope of federal employee collective bargaining rights
under the FSLMRS. In addition, the numerous statutory safeguards included in the FSLMRS strengthen the case that it is unnecessary to exempt federal employees from collective bargaining.
A. The FirstBattle in PreservingFederalEmployee Collective
BargainingRights in the Post-September 1 1 h World-Transportation
and Security Administration
The first battle after the passage of the Department of Homeland
Security Act occurred in January 2003 when the TSA Administrator,
Admiral James Loy, denied collective bargaining rights to his agency's
airport screeners for national security reasons. 10 9 The American Federation of Government Employees ("AFGE") challenged Admiral Loy's determination. 110 Both the Federal Labor Relations Authority ("FLRA")
and the District Court for the District of Columbia upheld the decision to
exclude the agency's airport screeners from collective bargaining."'
However, based on an interpretation of the FSLMRS, this exclusion
is unnecessary; the TSA has all the flexibility it needs to properly execute its mission. Federal employee collective bargaining rights do not
negatively impact TSA's ability to preserve national security. The AFGE
argues that national security is being used as a pretext for "union bust-

106. Department of Homeland Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).
107. H.R. 5710 § 842(a)(I)(A)-(B).
108. H.R. 5710 §842(c).
109. AFGE v. Loy, No. CIV.A.03-0043 (RMC), 2003 WL 22076475, at *1 (D.D.C. Sept. 5,
2003).
110.
Ill.

Id. at *1.
Id. at *4.
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ing" by the Bush administration.1 2 In giving the Bush administration the
benefit of the doubt, one possible reason for the administration's policy
is that it misinterprets the extent to which the FSLMRS provides it with
the flexibility it needs to manage federal employees in order to preserve
America's security.
Unfortunately, the valuable role that unions play for federal employees is often overlooked when national security is used to take away
federal employee collective bargaining rights. For example, despite the
exceptional job of Admiral Loy in organizing and managing the TSA,
the newly formed agency still has many organizational deficiencies that
adversely affect its airport screeners. 113 John Gage, National President of
the AFGE has argued that "TSA managers are ill-prepared to manage the
federal government's airport screener workforce. As a result, TSA
screeners face unsafe working conditions, abusive supervisors, discrimination and unfairly applied standards. Most screeners are fearful of
pointing out potentially dangerous practices for fear of immediate dismissal."" 14 Without collective bargaining rights, unions will not be able
to protect against potential abuses such as these. 115
Congress has continued to recognize the importance of labor unions
in the federal government. It provided for collective bargaining rights of
federal employees in the FSLMRS.1 6 In addition, Congress, in the passage of the Department of Homeland Security Act, ultimately determined that federal employees within that Department should retain these
rights.17 More recently, Congressman Robert Andrews (D-N.J.) introduced a Sense of the Congress Resolution 1 8 in response to the FLRA's
decision in AFGE v. Loy. 119 This Resolution argued that airport screeners
should retain their collective bargaining rights. 20 Labor experts have
also argued the same. For example, Drexel Shostak, who taught for 25
years at the George Meany Center for Labor Studies, argues that unionization actually increases productivity in government agencies. 121
112.

AFGE Fightsfor Collective Bargainingfor Screeners, FED. HUM. RESOURCES WK., June

27, 2003, at Vol. 10, No. 11.
113. AFGE PraisesHouse Resolution Proving Collective BargainingRightsfor TSA Screeners,
PR NEWSWIRE, Sept. 9, 2003, http://www.pmewswire.com.
114. Id.
115. Tim Barker, Push to Unionize Screeners Turns into a Political Battle, ORLANDO
SENTINEL TRIB., May 18, 2003, at ph. H1.
116. 5 USC §§ 7101-7135 (2000).
117. Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 842, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).
118. H.R. Con. Res. 275, 107th Cong. (2003).

119. 2003 WL 22076475, at *1.
120. H.R. Con. Res. 275.
121.

Barker, supra note 115, at ph. H 1.
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There is a need for concern that in the post-September I 1 th environment, federal employee collective bargaining rights could be taken
away for the wrong reasons. Whether the purpose is to weaken unions or
out of a fear that the government will not be able to protect America's
security, these collective bargaining rights are an integral part of the employees' abilities to perform their duties. Although national security is a
valid concern, federal employee collective bargaining rights do not inhibit the government's ability to protect America.
VI. STATUTORY ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL SERVICE LABORMANAGEMENT RELATIONS STATUTE

A. CongressionalPurpose
First and foremost, similar to their private sector counterparts, federal employees are provided with the right to "organize, bargain collectively, and participate through labor organizations of their own choosing
in decisions which affect them."' 22 The codification of these rights was a
major victory for federal employees because their collective bargaining
rights were formally recognized. Congress had three main objectives in
creating these statutory rights: (1) to safeguard the public interest; (2) to
contribute to the effective conduct of business in the public sector; and
(3) to foster settlements of disputes between employers and employees
involving conditions of employment. 23 Experience and success in both
the private and public sectors, through the NLRA and Executive Order
10,988 respectively, demonstrated that labor organizations and 24collective
bargaining for federal employees were in the public's interest.1
Contrary to arguments made that federal employee organizational
and collective bargaining rights inhibit federal government operations
and create inefficiencies, the FSLMRS, which grants these rights, explicitly requires that the interpretation of them be consistent with the administration of an efficient and accountable government.' 25 Historically,
the courts in applying the FSLMRS have adhered to Congress' desired
statutory interpretation and intent. For example, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Navy Public Works v. FLRA 126 held
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

5 U.S.C. § 7101(a)(1) (2000).
§ 7101(a)(1)(AHC).
§ 7101(a)(2).
§ 7101(b).
678 F.2d 97 (9th Cir. 1982).
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that a union could not negotiate contractual immunity from discipline for
federal employees who refused to respond and remained silent to a supervisor during a disciplinary investigation. 27 The court was concerned
that not requiring a duty to respond during disciplinary investigations
28
could severely reduce management's ability to discipline employees.
One of the principles on which the court based its holding in this case
was in carrying out the intent of Congress in enacting the FSLMRS. As
stated explicitly in the statute itself and as the court was guided in this
case, the provisions in the statute are to be interpreted in a manner consistent to make government "more efficient and accountable.' 29 This
case clearly illustrates the intent of Congress that collective bargaining
rights afforded to federal employees should not be interpreted to interfere with governmental missions and operations. Although Congress understood the need for federal employees to have collective bargaining
rights, it never intended for these civil protections to interfere with the
effectiveness of the federal government, especially the responsibility to
protect our nation's security.
To understand the breadth of the FSLMRS and the impact that its
provisions have on the efficiency and effectiveness of government, one
must initially be familiar with its terms and their interpretation and application. First, it is important to understand which employees and employers are covered by the FSLMRS. Second, an understanding of the
terms "collective bargaining" and, more importantly, "terms and conditions of employment" are critical, since their meaning and interpretation
are main factors that shape the scope of collective bargaining between
employees and a federal agency.
B. FederalEmployee Collective BargainingRights
A federal employee is a person employed by an agency of the federal government, or a person who has been terminated by an agency, as a
result of an unfair labor practice as defined in section 7116 and has not
obtained equivalent employment.130 Section 7103(a)(2)(B)(i)-(v) explicitly lists those individuals who are not considered employees under the
FSLMRS. 131
127. Id.at 101.
128. id.
129. Id.
130. 5 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(2)(AHB) (2000).
131. § 7103(a)(2)(B)(i)-(v). This provision provides, in relevant part:
(i) an alien or noncitizen of the United States who occupies a position outside the United States;
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Federal employee rights are defined in section 7102 of the
FSLMRS. 132 Federal employees have the right to "form, join, or assist
any labor organization, or to refrain from any such activity, freely and
without fear of penalty or reprisal. 133 Moreover, one of the main areas
addressed in this note is that federal employees may engage in collective
bargaining regarding the conditions of employment through representatives chosen by the employees of the agency.1 34 Collective bargaining is
defined as:
the performance of the mutual obligation of the representative of an
agency and the exclusive representative of employees in an appropriate
unit in the agency to meet at reasonable times and to consult and bargain in a good faith effort to reach agreement with
135 respect to the conditions of employment affecting such employees.
This statutory right provides a formal process for employees to communicate with their employer. Without this critical right, federal employees
would have no voice in determining the terms and conditions of their
employment. If they so choose, a federal employee also has the right to
act as a representative for a labor organization in advocating positions of
other groups involved in effecting
the organization to Congress and to
136
labor-management relations policy.
C. FederalEmployers Covered
Federal employers are defined under the statute as agencies. 37 An
agency includes all executive agencies within the federal government,
including the Library of Congress and the Government Printing Office.1 38 However, this provision explicitly excludes from coverage the
General Accounting Office, FBI, CIA, National Security Agency, Ten-

(ii) a member of the uniformed services;
(iii) a supervisor or a management official;
(iv) an officer or employee in the foreign service of the United States employed in Department of
State, the International Communication Agency, the United States International Development Cooperation Agency, the Department of Agriculture, or the Department of Commerce; or
(v) any person who participates in a strike in violation of § 7311 of this title. Id.
132. § 7102.
133. § 7102.
134. § 7102(2).
135. 5 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(12) (2000).
136. § 7102(1).
137. See § 7103(a)(3).
138. Id.
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nessee Valley Authority, FLRA, Federal Service Impasses Panel and the
United States Secret Service.1 39 In addition, the section also provides the
President of the United States with the authority to exclude any agency
140
or subdivision from coverage of the FSLMRS under section 7103(b).
D. Conditions of Employment
For a federal employer to be required to negotiate with a collective
bargaining unit, the issue to be bargained over must be a condition of
employment. Section 7117 of the FSLMRS requires the labor organization and the federal agency to bargain in good faith over conditions of
employment. 141 Conditions of employment include "personnel policies,
practices, and matters, whether established by rule, regulation, or otherwise, affecting working conditions.' 4 2 However, as explicitly stated in
the statute, "conditions of employment" do not include policies, practices and matters that "relat[e] to the classification of any position" or "to
the extent such matters are specifically provided for by Federal stat14 3
ute."'
First, in deciding whether a proposal involves a condition of employment, the FLRA considers: "(1) whether the matter proposed to be
bargained pertains to bargaining unit employees; and (2) the nature and
extent of the effect of the matter proposed to be bargained on working
conditions of those employees."' 144 In order for a proposal to be a condition of employment, the facts of the record must support that there is a
direct link between the proposal and the work situation or employment
relationship. 45 For example, in AFGE, AFL-CIO, Local 2094 v.
FLRA, 146 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
held that the Veterans' Administration Medical Center in New York had
no duty to bargain over the union-initiated proposal that allowed employee use of recreational facilities while on an off-duty status. 147 The
court reasoned that the union's proposal was outside the "conditions of
employment" because there was no direct relationship between the pro139. § 7103(a)(3)(A)-(H).
140. § 7103(b)(1).
141. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7103(a)(12), 7117 (2000).
142. § 7103(a)(14).
143. § 7103(a)(14)(A)-(C).
144. Antilles Consol. Educ. Ass'n v. FLRA, 22 F.L.R.A. 235, 237 (1986).
145. See Local 2094 v. FLRA, 833 F.2d 1037, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1987). See, e.g., Int'l Ass'n of
Fire Fighters, Local F- 116 v. Dep't of the Air Force, 7 F.L.R.A. 123 (1981).
146. 833 F.2d 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
147. Id. at 1039, 1046.
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posal and the work situation or employment relationship.) 48 The FLRA
has consistently determined that proposals that relate to non-work related
activities while employees are in a non-duty status do not create a duty
to bargain for an employer, unless a direct relationship can be established between the49union's proposal and the work situation or employment relationship. 1
A second factor that must be considered in whether a proposal involves a condition of employment is whether the proposal addresses an
area that is specifically provided for by a federal statute. All federal
agencies are established through enabling statutes passed by Congress. 5 °
An enabling statute establishes an agency's mission and its essential
functions.15 1 In particular, if the union proposal addresses an area provided for by a federal statute, then it is not a "condition of employment,"
and, therefore, a federal agency is not required to bargain over the proposal. 52 This is another example that demonstrates the limited scope and
restrictions placed on the areas that federal employees can collectively
bargain over with their employer relative to their private sector counterparts.
For example, in National Federationof Federal Employees, Local
1623 v. FLRA,' 53 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia held that a federal statute, the National Guard Technicians Act
("NGTA"), 154 precluded a union proposal from being a condition of employment. 155 In this case, the union represented National Guard technicians who performed maintenance and training in the South Carolina National Guard. 156 National Guard technicians are both civilian employees
and enlisted members in the National Guard. 157 The NGTA required that
when a technician's military and civilian positions became incompatible,
the member "shall be promptly separated from his technician employment by the adjutant general of the jurisdiction concerned."' 158 A technician's status becomes incompatible when his military and civilian posi-

148. Id.
149. See id.
150. ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, AN INTRODUCTION TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 46 (1997).

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id.
5 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(14)(C) (2000).
852 F.2d 1349 (1988).
32 U.S.C. § 709 (1982).
Local 1623, 852 F.2d at 1350.
Id.
Id.
§709(e)(1). See also Local 1623, 852 F.2d at 1351.
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tions are no longer comparable in rank. 159 In response, the union made a
proposal that the technician's civilian supervisors would be able to intervene when changes in the technician's military status put their civilian
job in jeopardy. 60 The union further proposed that changes in military
status that could result in job loss for the technicians be subject to appeal
before termination. 16' The South Carolina National Guard refused to
bargain and the FLRA agreed, holding that the proposal did not concern
"conditions of employment" and, therefore, was not bargainable. 62 The
FLRA reasoned, compatibility is a matter "specifically provided for by
federal statute" and therefore, not a bargainable "condition of employ63
ment."90

Federal employees of other agencies, including the newly formed
Department of Homeland Security, are restricted in the areas in which
they can collectively bargain over based on section 7117. Federal employees are limited to bargaining over personnel policies, practices, and
matters established by agency rule or regulation affecting working
conditions. However, other provisions of the FSLMRS, which will be
discussed later, can limit these bargaining areas. Such provisions include
management rights and the duty to bargain. Congress created all of these
safeguards to ensure that government operations and responsibilities
would not be adversely impacted. Therefore, it is a hollow claim that
federal employee collective bargaining rights inhibit the federal government in its ability to provide for our national security.
E. ManagementRights
The purpose of the Management Rights provision of the FSLMRS
is to remove certain management rights from a federal agency's duty to
bargain.164 Such rights are removed in order to promote the efficiency of
the federal government.165 The rights reserved to management officials
in section 7106(a) are considered essential to the ability of management
to execute its responsibilities. 66 These rights include, but are not limited
to, the right to determine the mission of the agency, the right to assign
159.
160.

Local 1623, 852 F.2d at 1351.

Id. at 1350.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1352.
164. 5 U.S.C. § 7106(a) (2000).
165. See Navy Charleston Shipyard v. FLRA, 885 F.2d 185, 187 (4th Cir. 1989); Dep't of
Health & Human Servs. v. FLRA, 844 F.2d 1087, 1091 (4th Cir. 1988).

166. See Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 844 F.2d at 1091.
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and remove employees within the agency, and the right to take whatever
actions may be necessary to carry out the agency mission during emer1 68
gencies.' 67 Therefore, these rights are exempted from bargaining.
However, an agency and a collective bargaining unit may bargain over
items, such as the number of employees and the skill set assigned to a
part of an agency, as well as the method and means by which the employees perform their jobs. 69 Additionally, it provides employees with a
remedy if employers fail to comply with the collective bargaining requirements.1 70 In granting management such broad rights, Congress effectively narrowed the scope of what federal employees could collectively bargain over. This is another example of a safeguard that Congress
created to ensure that government operations would not be inhibited by
federal employee collective bargaining rights.
Sections 7106(b)(2) and (b)(3) provide for the items that are mandatory subjects of negotiation. The FLRA uses the "direct interference" test
to determine whether the substance of a union proposal constitutes a negotiable procedure under section 7106(b)(2).' 7 ' If the proposal directly
interferes with the agency's management rights as set forth in section
7106(a), then the proposal is nonnegotiable. 172 If there is no such interference, the73proposal is considered procedural and would therefore be
negotiable.

AFGE, Local 2094 v. FLRA 174 is an example of a union proposal,
which was held not to constitute a procedure. In this case, the union proposed to have a union member on the agency's Position Management
Committee.1 75 The FLRA determined that this proposal was nonnegotiable because to allow such a proposal would directly interfere with management's right to "engage in free and open deliberations among themselves."' 176 Because the Position Management Committee is responsible
for reviewing and recommending approval prior to the execution of all
changes, including work design, occupational and grade distributions,
staffing requirements and costs, the FLRA decided that it was not merely

167. § 7106.
168. See Dep't Health & Human Servs., 844 F.2d at 1091.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

§ 7106(b)(1)-(2).
5 U.S.C. § 7106(b)(3) (2000).
See I.N.S. v. FLRA, 975 F.2d 218, 222 (5th Cir. 1992).
See id.
See id.
Local 2094, 833 F.2d 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1987).

175.

Id.at 1039.

176.

ld.at 1040.
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177
a procedure that the agency employed in exercising its reserved rights.
The union argued that although the Position Management Committee is
an essential part of the decision making process, 78 it is still only proce179
dural and thus, falls within the exception under section 7106(b)(2).
The court agreed with the FLRA by applying the direct interference
test.180 The court held that the proposal actually inhibited the agency
from exercising its management rights, amounting to direct182interference.1 81 The proposal was therefore found to be nonnegotiable.
As discussed in INS v. FLRA' 83 ("INS '), section 7106(b)(3) addresses the effects of the exercise of authority granted to management in
section 7106(a).184 If a federal employee is adversely affected, this section allows the union to propose an arrangement to address the situation
differently. This provides a safeguard for federal employees when they
are adversely affected. The FLRA uses the "excessive interference" to
determine whether a given union proposal constitutes an appropriate arrangement under section 7106(b)(3).' 85 The FLRA first determines
whether the proposal encompasses an arrangement for an adversely affected employee. 186 If the proposal constitutes an arrangement for an adversely affected employee, the FLRA next determines whether such an
arrangement excessively interferes with management's rights under section 7106(a). 187 The benefits afforded to the adversely affected employee
under such a88proposal are weighed against the burden on the management rights.1
In INS I,the union issued a proposal requesting that an employee be
given up to forty-eight hours to speak with a union representative before
the INS initiates questioning about a shooting incident. 189 The court
found that the proposal did not fall within the exception granted in section 7106(b)(3). 190 In making this determination, the court adopted the
"excessive interference test," which requires that the proposal be aimed

177. Id. at 1040.
178. This power is exercised under 5 U.S.C. § 7106(a).
179. Local 2094, 833 F.2d at 1040.
180. Id.at 1041.
181.

Id.

182. Id. at 1045-46.
183. I.N.S., 975 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1992).
184.

Id.

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

See id at 224.
See id.
See id.
975 F.2dat 224.
Id. at 219
Id.
at 225.
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at an adversely affected employee. 191 Because the union proposal was
not aimed solely at employees who are adversely affected by the INS'
questioning, it did not fall within the exception granted in section
7106(b)(3).' 92

Historically, courts have interpreted the language of the Management Rights clause of the FSLMRS and relied on its legislative history
to find that Congress intended the clause to be applied broadly in favor
of management. For example, in Dep 't of Health & Human Servs. v.
FLRA, '93 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the order of the FLRA and found that a union proposal would
violate the right to subcontract, granted exclusively in the Management
Rights provision of the FSLMRS. 9 4 During collective bargaining between the Department of Health and Human Services and the AFGE, the
union offered a proposal that would compel the Department to determine
in advance which projects would be contracted out.' 95 The Department
refused to bargain with the union over this proposal, asserting that it
would encroach upon the Department's explicit authority under the
Management Rights and was, therefore, nonnegotiable. 196 The court
found that Congress intended for the Management Rights clause to be
applied broadly, and construed in a way that would strengthen management's rights. 197 This case illustrates the deference given to management
and the limited scope of collective bargaining that federal employees actually have.
INS v.FLRA ("INS I')' 98 is an example of how the authority
granted to management ensures that it is capable of executing its mission, despite a union proposal. In this case, the union brought an unfair
labor practice charge against the INS for implementing its new policy
with respect to incidents involving the use of firearms.' 99 At the time the
charge was brought, the Federal Service Impasses Panel had not had an
opportunity to decide on the negotiability of the union's proposal. 200 The
FLRA determined that the proposal was nonnegotiable because it ad191. Id.
192. Id.at 225-26.
193. 844 F.2d 1087 (4th Cir. 1988).
194. Id. at 1090.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 1088, 1089.
197. Id. at 1090-91.
198. 995 F.2d 46(5th Cir. 1993).
199. Id. The union's proposal involved giving an employee up to forty-eight hours to speak
with a union representative before questioning by the employer about a shooting incident.
200. Id. at 47.
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dressed rights granted to the INS' management under section 7106(a). 21
The FLRA found that it was an unfair labor practice for the INS to implement its changes when it did, notwithstanding the negotiability of the
union's proposals. 20 2 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit reversed the finding of the FLRA, holding that the INS did not
commit an unfair labor practice. The court based its reasoning on the
theory that management officials must be able to solely decide how to
exercise their authority under section 7106, in order for their agency to
be as efficient and effective as possible.20 3 To hold otherwise would frustrate the policy behind the FSLMRS.2 °4
Although the representatives of federal employees may not be able
to bargain over as many items as their private sector counterparts, federal
employees enjoy many more benefits without having to go through the
trouble of bargaining. 0 5 Without the statutory safeguards that Congress
included in the FSLMRS, unions would pose a challenge to the federal
government's ability to manage.20 6 There is a concern that the federal
government should not employ a traditional collective bargaining
scheme because to do so would impair the government's decisionmaking power to represent the public interest. 20 7 Certain subjects that so
central to the decision-making process that they should only be determined unilaterally by management. As the cases discussed above demonstrate, the broad authority already granted to management officials is
enough to ensure that the rights afforded to federal employees under the
FSLMRS do not compromise national security.
F. Duty to Bargain
As stated earlier, the FSLMRS provides federal employees with the
statutory right to collectively bargain. This right creates an obligation for
both a member representing the employees and a representative from the
agency to meet at reasonable times and bargain in good faith regarding
conditions of employment that affect the employees.20 8 It should be
noted that the requirement to collectively bargain in good faith does not

201.
202.
203.
204.

Id.
Id. at 48.
Id.
Id. at 47.

205.

COLEMAN, supra note 25, at 9.

206. Id. at 5.
207.

PUBLIC-SECTOR BARGAINING 191 (Benjamin Aaron, et al. eds., 1979).

208.

5 U.S.C. § 7103(12) (2000).
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force either party to agree to a proposal or make concessions. 209 However, upon either party's request, the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement must be incorporated into a written document.210
Section 7117 of the FSLMRS covers the federal government's duty
to bargain in good faith. 21 1 The concept of good faith requires that the
agency and the union each have a responsibility to negotiate with one
another in ways that suggest that they are trying to actually reach an
agreement.212
Section 7117(a)(1) excludes from negotiability any proposal that
involves a government-wide rule or regulation, or a federal law. 21'3 The
whole premise behind this subsection is that it would be inconsistent
with public policy to allow agencies to bargain over proposals that are in
conflict with federal law.21 4 Section 71 17(a)(2) provides that the duty to
bargain generally does not extend to proposals that are the subject of an
agency regulation, if it is determined that there is a "compelling need"
for it. 215 However, section 7117(a)(3) holds that even when there is a

"compelling need" for an agency regulation, the substance of it will be
negotiable when it is determined that the regulation will cover a majority
of the employees who are represented by an exclusive union. 216
The FLRA has determined that a rule or regulation is a governmentwide rule or regulation if it is "generally applicable throughout the Federal Government., 217 However, it need not be applicable to every federal
employee.218 To so require would render this provision of the FSLMRS
meaningless. There does not seem to be any rule or regulation that affects every federal employee.2 19
In Dep 't of Military Affairs v. FLRA,220 the union submitted a proposal to the agency, involving the manner in which the agency would respond to the union's request for information about its employees under

209. Id.
210. Id.
211. §7117.
212. COLEMAN, supra note 25, at 99.
213. See Dep't of Military Affairs v. FLRA, 964 F.2d 26, 27 (D.C. Cir. 1992).

214. See id. 5 U.S.C. § 7117(a)(2) covers an agency regulation, rather than a government-wide
rule or regulation.
215.

5 U.S.C. § 7117(a)(2) (2000).

216. § 7117(a)(3).
217. See United States Customs Serv. v. FLRA, 873 F.2d 1473, 1475 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Overseas Educ. Ass'n, Inc. v. FLRA, 827 F.2d 814, 816-17 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
218.

See Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. IRS, 3 F.L.R.A. 748, 7 (1980).

219. See id. at 10.
220. 964 F.2d 26 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
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The agency refused to

bargain with the union, asserting that such a proposal was nonnegotiable
because it was inconsistent with FOIA, a federal law.223 The FLRA held
that the proposal was not inconsistent with FOIA and therefore was negotiable.22 4 However, the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia reversed the findings of the FLRA, holding that the union's
proposal was inconsistent with FOIA.225 This case illustrates the impact
that a federal statute has on federal employee collective bargaining rights
under section 71 17(a)(1). Because FOIA addressed the issue of personal
employee information, it therefore precluded this issue from collective
bargaining.
When the union's proposal involves an agency rule or regulation,
the agency has a duty to bargain over the subject proposal if the FLRA
has not determined that there is a "compelling need" for such a rule or
regulation. 226 In section 71 17(b)(2) of the FSLMRS, Congress identified
comprehensive procedures that should be used in the determination of
whether a "compelling need" exists. 227 A compelling need for an agency

rule or regulation exists unless the specific conditions set forth in section
7117(b)(2).2 28
Section 7117(b) sets forth the exclusive procedure for determining
whether a compelling need for an agency rule or regulation exists.229 In
FLRA v. Aberdeen Proving Ground, the Supreme Court affirmed the
holding that "the language of the Federal Labor-Management Relations
Act persuades us that Congress [intended for] the § 7117(b) negotiability
appeal to be the sole means of determining a compelling need question
under the statute., 230 Based on the Supreme Court's holding in this case
221. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).
222. Dep't of Military Affairs, 964 F.2d at 26. The proposal provided: "[d]ata/information that
the Union could receive from an employee, does not relieve the [agency] from providing that
data/information to the Union." Id.
223. Id. at 27-28.
224. Id. at 28.
225. Id.
226.
227.
228.

5 U.S.C. § 7117(a)(2) (2000).
§ 7117(b)(1H2).
§ 7117(b)(2) provides:

For the purpose of this section, a compelling need shall be determined not to exist for any rule or
regulation only if(A) the agency, or primary national subdivision, as the case may be, which issued the rule or regulation informs the Authority in writing that a compelling need for the rule or regulation does not exist;
or
(B) the Authority determines that a compelling need for a rule or regulation does not exist. Id.
229.
230.

§ 7117(b).
485 U.S. 409, 412 (1988).
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and the explicit language of the statute, there is a great deal of deference
provided to the agency in determining whether a compelling need exists
for the rule or regulation. Thus, the agency can, to a degree, effectively
control the scope of collective bargaining of its federal employees by
creating a rule or regulation. Before a union can assert that the agency
has a duty to bargain over a proposal inconsistent with such rule or regulation, the FLRA must determine that there is no compelling need for the
agency rule or regulation. 231 Without such a determination, the proposal
is nonnegotiable.
Section 7117(a)(3) provides an exception to section 7117(a)(2).
Even when a compelling need exists for an agency rule or regulation, the
agency must bargain over a proposal involving such if an exclusive union represents at least a majority of the employees within the agency that
are affected by that rule or regulation.23 2 In Ass 'n of Civilian Technicians
v. FLRA, 233 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that under section 7117(a)(3), agency rules or regulations
that have a compelling need are only subject to negotiation by the
agency if a majority of the employees are affected by such rule or
regulation and are represented by the same union.234 To require
negotiation otherwise would subject the agency to "piecemeal
negotiations with numerous bargaining units throughout the agency. 23s
This case demonstrates the extremely narrow exception that allows
federal employees to collectively bargain over an agency rule or
regulation when a compelling need for such rule or regulation exists.
Section 7117 is another statutory safeguard that provides the federal
government with the flexibility it needs to preserve America's security.
Therefore, there is no need to take away federal employee collective
bargaining rights.
VII. CONCLUSION

By applying the long established principle of statutory construction
that a legislative act, in this case the FSLMRS, should be read as a whole
to determine its effect, it has been demonstrated that the President has all
the power he needs to address the threats to our national security. Even
though Congress granted collective bargaining rights to federal employ231.

See id; United States Army Eng'r Ctr. v. FLRA, 762 F.2d 409, 412 (4th Cir. 1985).

232.

5 U.S.C. § 7117(a)(3) (2000).

233.
234.

756 F.2d 172 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
Id. at 178.

235.

Id.
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ees, it never intended that these rights interfere with the flexibility and
effectiveness of the federal government. This has been proven not only
by stating the explicit statutory purpose, but also by showing the numerous statutory safeguards that Congress included to ensure flexible government operations. The limited scope of bargaining, coupled with the
broad management rights granted, ensures that the government is able to
perform its missions in the most efficient manner. Therefore, it is a hollow claim that federal employee collective bargaining rights adversely
impact the President's ability to preserve national security. This note has
shown that section 7103(b) of the FSLMRS is more a provision of convenience, rather than one that is critical to ensure that collective bargaining rights do not inhibit the federal government's ability to protect
America. Historically, this section has been overused.236 Contrary to the
beliefs of those who oppose federal employee collective bargaining
rights, these rights are critical to an effectively functioning federal workforce. The collective bargaining rights of employees of the Department
of Homeland Security should not be taken away. The President has all
the power he needs.
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